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sure, a powerful critique. It frames just war theory as a vapid but also pernicious discourse that ennobles military conflict and thereby renders it more palatable for general consumption. 2 Indeed, by reminding us of the grim realities of so-called just wars, the phrase punctures the moral pretensions of just war theory, exposing it as so much cant. Just war is, it seems, after all, just war. 3 There is, however, an irony here. Where the idea that just war is just war is usually invoked to discredit the enterprise of just war theory, it can also be taken as a reminder of why we need it in the first place. Viewed in this light, what is presented as a critique of just war theory is actually better understood as a restatement of its raison d'être. It is precisely because just war is just war, with all that this implies, that we must think so carefully and so judiciously about it. This enjoins, among other things, thinking in a frank and forthright way about what is signified (and putatively justified) by the "war" in "just war." 4 My concern, which echoes those of other scholars in the field, is that just war theorists have not always done a good job of this. 5 One could mount a case, for instance, that the rump of just war scholarship over the past decade has been characterized by disinterest regarding the material realities of warfare. 6 Is this still the case? This essay examines how, if at all, the idea that just war is just war has been negotiated by surveying a series of benchmark books on the ethics of war published over the past year.
THE VIEW FROM GAZA
To begin, Contemporary Just War: Theory and Practice, by Tamar Meisels, is an ambitious and interesting book that pursues a dual purpose. On the one hand, it offers a "defense" of Michael Walzer's "traditional" just war theory. On the other, it seeks to extend that theory, now reinforced, to a range of contemporary issues and conflicts that have otherwise largely been ignored by just war scholars. A few brief words to describe Meisels's treatment of these objectives will provide a useful platform for the discussion that follows.
Regarding the first objective, Meisels's decision to characterize this book as a defense of Walzer's traditional approach is revealing. It discloses her perception of contemporary just war theory as a "deeply divided" field, with Walzer's theory on the back foot against a "revisionist" alternative that Meisels associates with, among others, Jeff McMahan, Cecile
Fabre, and David Rodin (p. 2). As there has already been much written in these pages about the distinction between revisionist and traditionalist approaches to the ethics of war, it will suffice here to note that Meisels pins it to a divergence of views on three key issues: civilian immunity, the moral equality of soldiers, and the independence of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello poles of just war theorizing from one another. Meisels observes that support for the traditional approach to these issues has been waning in recent years, in both theory and practice, and devotes the first three substantive chapters of the book to reaffirming and indeed reinforcing it. Not only are these chapters clearly elucidated and tightly argued, they are also pitched at a level that caters to specialists in the field without forsaking anything in terms of accessibility for a wider readership.
Meisels's second objective, which she pursues in the latter half of the book, is to apply Walzer's framework to a set of issues that have so far been overlooked by just war theorists. Force to counter rocket-fire emanating from Gaza, she is addressing issues that she obviously cares deeply about, and, crucially, has observed at close quarters (p. xi). This matters insofar as it is presumably this proximity to the frontline that accounts for her determination to treat what she calls "the unfortunate reality of war," rather than its representation in the popular imagination (p. 159). Thus, instead of basing her analysis on the Hollywood vision of warfare-that is, on an agonal world of large-scale pitched battles and the clash of state armies-she focuses on the less romantic but equally deadly actuality of economic sanctions, kill-chains, and counter-insurgency operations.
This focus on the realities of war should not be interpreted as secondary to the theoretical contribution Meisels seeks to make in this book; rather, it is integral to it. Insofar as she frames her book in terms of the theoretical dispute between traditionalist and revisionist approaches to just war, she depicts this rift as hinging on the different ways in which war is posited in these schools of thought. As she presents it, whereas traditionalists base their just war theory on a plausible account of war, revisionist reasoning rests on a flawed understanding of war (pp. p. 14-15, 34-35, 45, 152). This flawed understanding comprises two dimensions, one conceptual and the other empirical. The conceptual dimension pertains to the revisionists' predilection to view war as a realm of individual rather than collective agency. Meisels notes the arguments that revisionists proffer for apprehending war in this way and dismisses them. She contends that the revisionist just war theory is premised upon a set of domestic analogies (e.g., to disputes between individuals in civil society or cases of armed robbery) that simply do not reflect the collective and indeed uncivil realities of war (pp. 18, 34, 45). Thus configured, revisionist just war theory is primed for failure. The empirical dimension reflects the revisionists' apparent inability to look beyond the Hollywood vision of war. The charge intimated here is that, to the degree that it addresses warfare at all, revisionist theorizing is indexed to an outmoded, agonal, classical inter-state vision of warfare that bears little relation to the asymmetric realities of contemporary armed conflict. This is a contingent point, and it strikes me that many revisionists would have grounds to refute it. Yet it also suggests a novel insight, namely, that the claim that how we think about "war" primes how we think about "just war" has both an empirical and a theoretical dimension.
There is, however, an element of narrowness to Contemporary Just War. Consider, for example, the frame of reference it adopts for just war theorizing. Walzer's just war theory is introduced as the traditional account of just war with scant reference made to the deeper tradition of just war thinking that is often traced to antiquity. As such, the "revisionist" character of Walzer's own enterprise is overlooked. 7 The only exception to this occurs in the introduction, where Meisels briefly cites the writings of Francisco de Vitoria and his contemporary interpreter, Gregory M. Reichberg. This is, however, a very minor point, and
does not detract from the overall quality of the book. supported by a number of high-profile just war theorists, Elshtain included, and opposed by several died-in-the-wool realists, Mearsheimer among them. How had it come to pass that just war theory, which Morkevičius had always associated with the restraint of war, now appeared more bellicose than the doctrine of realpolitik espoused by Mearsheimer and company? Realist Ethics reflects her efforts to discover an answer to that question. The answer she arrives at, and which is set out in a pleasingly avuncular manner over the course of the book, comprises two principal claims: first, that contemporary just war theory has, to its detriment, fallen in thrall to a crusading brand of liberal internationalism; and second, that this situation can be best remedied by re-connecting just war theory to its roots in realist thought (p. 6-7, 58, 196).
GET REAL
The claim that just war theory is in hock to liberal internationalism is a familiar refrain. It recalls A. J. P. Taylor's waspish remark that while realists of the nineteenth century "fought 'necessary' wars, and killed thousands, the idealists of the twentieth century fight 'just' wars and kill millions." 8 It also resonates with recent arguments by Nicholas Rengger and Maja Zehfuss that the problem with contemporary just war theory is that it is yoked to a form of do-gooder liberal sentiment that mistakenly supposes war can be a force for good in the world. 9 Although their arguments emphasize different points, these authors invoke the same critical insight that just war is just war to debunk the jejune belief that the use of force can ever make the world a better place. Rengger and Zehfuss are in agreement: no matter how well intentioned they may be, or how justified they are, just wars, like all other wars, are necessarily a terrible thing. To the degree that the notion of just war has any validity-and Zehfuss doubts that it does-it can only be as a via negativa, that is, as a remedial measure that is intended to halt even more terrible things from occurring. Although Morkevičius occasionally puts matters slightly differently, this is, I think, her general position too (p. 38-39).
Morkevičius's second claim, that the best way to rescue just war theory from liberal internationalism is by resurrecting its "embedded realism," is intriguing. It supposes that the facile attitude to the use of force that taints contemporary just war theory can be rectified by reviving the realist impulse that has historically been a central feature of just war thought, but which has recently fallen into abeyance. This will involve not only acknowledging that just war is just war, but also confronting the implications of this insight. Morkevičius thus makes the case that, instead of negating just war theory, the insight that just war is just war is necessary for its recovery as a "critical tradition" (p. 7).
The way that Morkevičius develops this argument is fascinating. She approaches the idea of just war from a comparative perspective, which is especially important. Instead of focusing narrowly on the Western conception of just war, she incorporates its Islamic and
Hindu counterparts into her analysis. This allows her to both broaden and deepen our understanding of just war, while also undercutting the charge that just war is quintessentially a Western construct. The rigor of Morkevičius's scholarship is exemplary, with her treatment of Hindu just war thought a real highlight.
There are of course aspects of the book that could be critiqued. The discussion of realism, for instance, could be construed as a little on the thin side as it is heavily dependent upon how realist ideas have been developed in International Relations theory, rather than in political thought more generally. 10 Beyond this, there are two aspects of the argument that I think should have been developed further. The first of these is not so much a new point as an extension of the previous one, as it pertains to Morkevičius's synopsis of realism. Because her preference is to distill realism into a set of core tenets, she privileges consensus over plurality, which in turn leads her to overlook disagreements among realists. This approach has the effect of granting a certain degree of prominence to the voices of mainstream realists, like Mearsheimer, while giving short shrift to those who might not be quite so familiar, but who nevertheless have much to teach us. Where, for instance, are the "righteous realists" that Joel Rosenthal wrote about in his book on realist ethics? 11 The second aspect of the argument that could have been developed further is the relationship between just war and realism. The issue here is that Morkevičius only gives one side of the story. While she is correct to highlight the "parallels" between realism and just war thinking, it would have been helpful to hear more about the differences between these two traditions. Are there, for instance, pressure points that bring their differences to the surface? The answer to this question is presumably yes, with the issue of preventive war a prime contender. Realists and just wat theorists have historically differed on this issue, with the former willing to countenance it in certain conditions, and the latter strictly opposed to it.
Indeed, many just war theorists-though not Elshtain-opposed the 2003 Iraq War on the basis that it was, in their eyes, a preventive war. The structure of Morkevičius' discussion does not, however, permit for any discussion of such issues. This is a pity, but it does not tarnish what is otherwise a wonderfully insightful and thought-provoking book.
WHEN THOMAS MET JEFF
The final book is Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace, by Gregory M. Reichberg. This is, simply put, one of the best books on the ethics of war to emerge in the past decade, and it should be essential reading for every scholar interested in just war theory. Lest there be any confusion, when I write "every scholar," this is not shorthand for "every historian of the just war tradition," or "every exegete of Thomas Aquinas." The title of the book is unhelpful in this regard: it lends the impression that this is a book with a very narrow or even arcane
focus. This could not be further from the truth. The book does not treat the analysis of 40). This is interesting insofar as it reminds us that even though Aquinas thought that war could be justified in certain circumstances, he did not necessarily think it was a good thing, or something to be celebrated. Rather, it was always a symptom of a prior failure of politics. McMahan and Walzer and their respective schools, Reichberg reminds us that behind today's fractious debates there is a fruitful dialogue about substantive issues to be had. In so doing, he does just war scholarship a great service.
It should not escape our attention, however, that the final chapter of Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace looks beyond these issues to engage the views of Pope John Paul II on the limits of just war. Even when it is justified, we are told, war is never a sufficient response to the problems that occasioned it, and it is always a defeat for humanity. Just war is, after all, just war, and, regardless of how refined or sophisticated our theories are, this will always be the case.
CONCLUSION
There is a saying, often attributed to Bertrand Russell, that war does not determine who is right, only who is left. The books examined in this essay all recognize this fact, but, rather than viewing it as grounds for abandoning the idea of just war, they take it as a reason to think more carefully about it. As such, their efforts remind us that we should treat the claim that just war is just war not as a glib soundbite but as an inescapable irony that we must confront even as it makes a mockery of us all. 
